Post by account_disabled on Mar 13, 2024 4:33:39 GMT -5
The supposedly free nature of the special transfer arises from the absence of any work plan to condition the achievement of previously agreed or planned purposes. Nothing was said or predicted about the stock of stopped works despite article of the LRF nor about the need for coherence and adherence to sectoral planning of public policies.
Given the narrow political calendar already at stake the mandatory parliamentary amendments — which are now guaranteed by a rigidly detailed budget execution calendar — ultimately intend to have a strong and immediate impact on the municipal elections with the risk of even abuse. of political power. As if such a chronological CG Leads risk was already foreseen in view of the prohibition inscribed in article VI paragraph “a” of Law article º II of LDO determined that it be ensured even in the first half of the effective financial transfer of all amendments that “add resources to automatic and regular transfers to be carried out by the Union to a federative entity” article of the LDO.
Something similar in fact had occurred in the municipal elections in relation to article of Amendment which had determined still in the first half of that election year the effective financial transfer of of the total special transfers.
Here we are not just questioning the personality and the short-term nature of the transfer given its implicit desire to once again impact the municipal electoral dynamics. What demands special reflection is the constitutive nature of the phenomenon: each deputy and senator can behave as an arbitrary expense organizer up to the limit of their personal amendment as each parliamentary mandate tends to be treated as an autonomous budgetary unit that passes to the broad budgetary and sectoral planning.
In an analogy with would be the body responsible not only for the preparation but would also assume responsibility albeit indirectly for the execution as a privileged type of expense organizer of the special transfer of his imposing amendment especially because its own mandate would correspond to a heterodox budgetary unit.
This is a consistent risk of “allotment” that deserves to be read together with the agenda to expand the Electoral Fund that passes through the federal Ploa for to R billion a level of compared to .
As pertinently raised by Bruno Carazza in relation to what had happened similarly in : “ With more money and less control party owners will have the perfect scenario to carry out schemes with companies owned by relatives and friends”.
Given the narrow political calendar already at stake the mandatory parliamentary amendments — which are now guaranteed by a rigidly detailed budget execution calendar — ultimately intend to have a strong and immediate impact on the municipal elections with the risk of even abuse. of political power. As if such a chronological CG Leads risk was already foreseen in view of the prohibition inscribed in article VI paragraph “a” of Law article º II of LDO determined that it be ensured even in the first half of the effective financial transfer of all amendments that “add resources to automatic and regular transfers to be carried out by the Union to a federative entity” article of the LDO.
Something similar in fact had occurred in the municipal elections in relation to article of Amendment which had determined still in the first half of that election year the effective financial transfer of of the total special transfers.
Here we are not just questioning the personality and the short-term nature of the transfer given its implicit desire to once again impact the municipal electoral dynamics. What demands special reflection is the constitutive nature of the phenomenon: each deputy and senator can behave as an arbitrary expense organizer up to the limit of their personal amendment as each parliamentary mandate tends to be treated as an autonomous budgetary unit that passes to the broad budgetary and sectoral planning.
In an analogy with would be the body responsible not only for the preparation but would also assume responsibility albeit indirectly for the execution as a privileged type of expense organizer of the special transfer of his imposing amendment especially because its own mandate would correspond to a heterodox budgetary unit.
This is a consistent risk of “allotment” that deserves to be read together with the agenda to expand the Electoral Fund that passes through the federal Ploa for to R billion a level of compared to .
As pertinently raised by Bruno Carazza in relation to what had happened similarly in : “ With more money and less control party owners will have the perfect scenario to carry out schemes with companies owned by relatives and friends”.